NHS haemophilia scandal: 'IN COLD BLOOD'

Editorial Note: WHAT follows below must be of great concern at a time when people are proclaiming 'DEFEND THE NHS'. It was clear to those of us that watched this program that people responsible at the top both in the NHS and within government were aware that possible contaminated blood products were being imported from the USA and that patients were being urged to inject themselves. The people in charge were prepared to take the risk seemingly because not to do so would have detrimental commercial consequences for the NHS. What will be of interest here is would a less centralised body have done the same?

From the Daily Mirror:

ITV documentary In Cold Blood delves into chilling 1980s haemophilia scandal in UK

The stories of lives destroyed by the haemophilia scandal, which killed more people than any other UK disaster, are revealed in a new ITV documentary

It exposes a 1980s cover-up over bleeding disorder patients receiving a treatment made from US donor blood – some of which was infected with the HIV and hepatitis C viruses.

Some victims were compensated, but with a gagging clause attached.

Colin and Denise Turton lost their son, Lee, at the age of 10, six years after he was infected with HIV.

Denise says on camera he suffered years of “hell”.

Over 4,000 people were infected with hepatitis C and 1,300 with HIV.

Documents revealing blunders that saw thousands killed by contaminated blood products were destroyed as the scandal emerged.

Officials at the Department of Health feared their failures to protect haemophiliacs would be made public, so dispatched records for shredding, say campaigners.

In the 1970s the Factor 8 treatment for haemophilia was prescribed on the NHS, but demand saw surplus sourced from America where donors were paid.

This encouraged them to lie about their medical past, and saw diseased products given to Brits.

More than 1,300 people were given HIV, and more than 4,000 people got Hepatitis C.

Around 2,400 died due to the infected blood products and a public inquiry into the scandal is ongoing.

Campaigners say the Government knew blood was dodgy and did nothing, then tried to hide their failure.

Former health minister David Owen this week told the infected blood inquiry victims had been failed by politicians and medics alike.

He said he “deeply regretted” that the UK had not become self-sufficient in blood products and continued to import them from the US.

In Cold Blood was on Sunday at 10.20 on ITV.

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Not Seeing The Wood For The Trees

 Not Seeing The Wood For The Trees

by Les May

THE juxtaposition of my article There’s No Pockets In A Shroud with articles dealing with the iniquities of local councils might be taken to mean that I think that this is the main issue to be solved with regard to the social care of those who require it due to age, infirmity or accident. That is not my view and I have some sympathy with local councils who have to implement a social care system they did not establish and are expected to do so without the necessary funding, by cutting their budget in other areas of operation. That some will resort to dodgy practices tells us more about the integrity of the officers and councillors involved than about how the flaws in the present system can be remedied.

As I tried to stress we have a system of social care in England which has a strong resemblance to the health system we had in the 1930s and which was found wanting. In other words our social care system is funded partially by central government, partially by local government, partially by individuals who are unfortunate as to need to make use of it, and partially by those who work in it via poor pay and poor conditions of service.

The 1930s health care system was swept away by the coming of the National Health Service in 1948. This was (and is) both universal and comprehensive. It is based upon the principle of shared risk and shared funding. In other words we acknowledge that we can all become ill or have an accident, and so all of us should pay our share to fund it. ‘Our share’ means not that we all pay the same amount, but that those who earn more, pay more. In other words it is redistributive. Some fortunate people will be able to boast they ‘never had a day’s illness in their life’ and some unfortunate people will have child born with chronic condition.

It is unrealistic to expect to fund a similar universal and comprehensive system of social care via further taxes on income so we must look towards implementing taxes on wealth, specifically taxes on inherited wealth. In this context the term universal means free at source to everyone regardless of income or wealth, and comprehensive means both residential and non-residential support. Universal means the rich, the poor and everyone in between.

For most of us our ‘wealth’ is tied up in the house we live in. House price inflation comfortably outstrips the general rate of inflation of the cost of other goods and services, and has done for many years. Hence those fortunate enough to be a house owner have had to do absolutely nothing as the cash value of their house increases, nor have their beneficiaries after they die, so I see little moral objection to a tax on inherited wealth. Unless that is you think personal greed is a virtue.

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Thank You Nye Bevan

by Les May

EVERY TIME I hear a Tory minister talk about ‘Our NHS’ I wince a little.  The National Health Service was the creation of the post war Labour government. But even that is not quite true; the NHS as we know it was the creation of one man, Aneurin Bevan, better known as Nye Bevan, which is why we have an NHS facility named after him in Rochdale.

Certainly there were other people who deserve credit, especially William Beveridge whose 1942 report fed the appetite for the state to take better care of its citizens.

Beveridge advocated a scheme that was universal in that it was to cover all people and comprehensive in that it would cover all needs.  He assumed that it would be run by local government and that it would be a social insurance scheme with a contribution from the government of the day.   Beveridge also favoured patients paying ‘hotel’ charges for their stay in hospital and charges for ‘appliances’.

His scheme would have replaced the one that had gradually evolved so that in the 1930s about 90% of the workforce had social insurance, which covered the of the GP service and sick pay.  The other 10% and all dependants either had private insurance or made full out-of-pocket payments.  The costs of hospital care were met by private insurance, such as workers' contributory schemes.  This met the needs of about 10 millions of the population and the rest paid means-tested charges. Local and national taxes funded public health, hospitals and the specialist clinics run by local authorities.

Bevan saw things differently and effectively nationalised the health service. He favoured a fully tax-financed system.  He did this because funding based upon national taxation is inherently more redistributive.  He also regarded free access to health care to be a citizen's right and not something conditional on the payment of contributions.  In addition a tax based scheme neatly sidestepped the problem of how, politically and administratively, the non-insured could be turned away from a universal service.

‘The collective principle asserts that... no society can legitimately call itself civilised if a sick person is denied medical aid because of lack of means.’

— Aneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear, p. 100

We should be thankful that we have a tax based system. Imagine if you felt ill and found that your insurance would pay for a test for Covid19, but not for your treatment or care.   It has happened in the USA.   Imagine if you have just recovered from a stay in hospital being treated for a Covid19 infection and then someone starts chasing you for ‘hotel charges’.

What Bevan did not solve in 1948 was the question of who should pay for the care of the elderly. Should it be the NHS and its tax based system or local authorities who were free to make a charge.  No one else has shown the will to solve it since.

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Confessions of an NHS whistle-blower!



ALTHOUGH this book by Milton Peña Vásquez is not without its faults, mainly in the editing, it ought to be compulsory reading for any young person intent on embarking upon a career in the medical profession. Not only does it give a revealing and honest account of the internal workings of Tameside hospital, but it also exposes the incompetence of NHS managers and their attempts to cover up their failings by threats and intimidation.
The findings of the Keogh review team which were published in a report in July 2013, led to the resignation of Christine Green, the Chief Executive of Tameside Hospital and Tariq Mahmood, the hospital Medical Director. Among its findings, the report stated that Tameside Hospital had the 7th highest rate of infection for MRSA of 141 Trusts nationally over the three years from 2010-2012 and had the second highest infection rate in the country for Clostridium difficile, over the same period. It also found that:

'The Trust’s clinical negligence payments have significantly exceeded contributions to the ‘risk sharing scheme’ over the last three-years, by a total of £21m over this period.' 

Yet, in spite of its appalling record for mortality, cleanliness and safety, Tameside Hospital managed to obtain foundation trust status in February 2008 (“supposedly the benchmark of excellence”) when death rates were 19% above the average and safety was the “sixth-worst in England” (Daily Mail 30/11/2009). Mrs Green also managed to secure a 17% pay rise which took her salary from £120,000 to £140,000 a year.

READ MORE:

http://tamesideinfocus.blogspot.co.uk/2016/07/confessions-of-nhs-whistle-blower_10.html