ON June 23, 2016, British voters decided by a margin of 52 percent
to 48 percent that the United Kingdom should leave the European
Union. Since then, British politics has been convulsed by the
referendum’s repercussions. Some Remainers do not accept the
finality of the vote. The margin, they argue, was too narrow to
provide a mandate for fundamental change, while some of the arguments
that persuaded voters to support Leave were mendacious. The hope
that Britain could, in the words of then-Foreign Secretary Boris
Johnson, have its cake and eat it has proved misplaced.
The hope that Britain could, in the words of then-Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson, have its cake and eat it has proved
misplaced.
If, to alter the metaphor, one leaves a tennis club because one
does not wish to pay the subscription and does not like the rules,
one will not be able to continue to use the tennis courts on the same
basis as the members. Therefore, some Remainers conclude, there
should be a second referendum, to discover whether the British people
still wish to leave the European Union.
The European issue is difficult for Parliament to resolve for two
reasons. The first is that May’s government holds only a minority
of seats—317 out of the 650—in the House of Commons, meaning it
must rely for its narrow majority on the 10 members of parliament
from the vehemently pro-Brexit Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of
Northern Ireland. But, perhaps even more important, both the
Conservatives and the opposition Labour Party are internally divided
between Remainers and Brexiteers. That division reflects a
geographical and cultural division in the country.
The large cities, together with Scotland and Northern Ireland,
welcome globalization and are relaxed about the EU’s principle of
freedom of movement. They voted to remain. But smaller towns and
older manufacturing areas, in which many feel left behind, are
hostile to globalization and freedom of movement, which, they argue,
have kept wages down and put undue pressure on public services. These
areas supported the Leave campaign.
Parliament has enacted that Britain will leave the EU on March 29.
After long and tortuous negotiations, Prime Minister Theresa May in
November 2018 secured a deal with the EU. That deal comprises a
legally binding withdrawal agreement providing for a transition
period until December 2020, during which Britain will remain bound by
EU rules while negotiating the final relationship. The pattern of
that relationship is outlined in a nonbinding political declaration
that hints at an outcome in which Britain could negotiate independent
trade agreements, while also providing it with some degree of
frictionless trade with the EU.
May’s cabinet, despite internal tensions between Remainers and
Brexiteers, accepted the deal. But the Tories’ DUP allies were
fiercely opposed to it, as they claimed that it might separate
Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom by preventing a
hard border with the Irish Republic and potentially creating a
customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United
Kingdom. The deal was also opposed both by Brexiteers in the
Conservative Party, who claimed that it tied Britain too closely to
the EU, and by Remainers—primarily Labour, but also Liberal
Democrats and Scottish Nationalists—who argued that it allowed for
too many barriers to the export of goods and services to the EU. This
coalition of incompatibles imposed a crushing defeat on the
government motion to accept the deal on Jan. 15. Just 202 MPs
supported it, while 432 rejected it.
A defeat of this magnitude is unparalleled in Britain’s
parliamentary history. No fewer than 118 Conservatives, mostly hard
Brexiteers, voted against the deal, with just 196 Conservatives
supporting it. And many of those who voted for it had no choice.
(Because approximately 100 Conservative MPs are ministers or on
the government payroll, they were duty-bound to support May or
resign. This means that a majority of Conservative backbenchers were
opposed to the deal.) May’s defeat, in what was arguably the most
important parliamentary vote in Britain since World War II, creates a
moment of acute danger for the prime minister, the government, the
Conservative Party, and the country.
A harder Brexit to placate Conservative rebels would alienate
Conservative Remainers. Conversely, a softer Brexit to win support
from the opposition parties would increase the number of Conservative
rebels.
The hope was that the deal could unite Brexiteers and Remainers.
Instead it has driven them further apart. A harder Brexit to placate
Conservative rebels would alienate Conservative Remainers.
Conversely, a softer Brexit to win support from the opposition
parties would increase the number of Conservative rebels. Indeed,
there may be no deal that could hold the Conservative Party together;
an alternative could end the cabinet truce and possibly lead to the
disintegration of the minority government, with a general election to
follow.
It has happened before. In 1979, the Labour minority government
led by James Callaghan disintegrated in this way, in part because
Labour was internally divided on the issue of devolving power to
Scotland. Then, in 1951, Clement Attlee’s Labour government, which
enjoyed a majority of only five, disintegrated because the party was
internally divided between left and right. In both cases, long
periods in the opposition followed.
The vote also creates a moment of danger for the country. Since
Parliament has already approved a bill stating Brexit will occur on
March 29, that is the default position. The exit date can,
admittedly, be extended with the agreement of the other 27 members of
the European Union. But those countries may be unwilling to agree if
the only reason for extension is that MPs, 30 months after the
referendum, still cannot make up their minds. In any case, an
extension would only postpone the dilemma. It would not resolve it.
Unless Parliament passes new legislation—and there are now fewer
than 40 sitting days before March 29—Britain will leave the EU
without a deal. That is regarded by most commentators as
disastrous,
since it would mean that EU customs duties and, even more
disadvantageously, an intimidating host of EU regulations would be
imposed on British exports. It would no longer be as easy to send
goods from London to Paris or Frankfurt as it is to send goods from
London to Edinburgh.
The Jan. 15 vote showed what MPs are against. But there seems to
be little agreement on what they are for. Theresa May is now seeking
consensus through all-party talks, although she has not yet budged on
her so-called red lines, namely that Britain should leave both the
European customs union (in order to pursue an independent trade
policy) and the single market (to avoid allowing free movement of
people and the jurisdiction of EU courts). And the opposition parties
see no reason to help her. Labour is unwilling to allow its deep
internal divisions to be publicly exposed by articulating a clear
alternative policy. It seeks not consensus but a general election to
remove the Conservatives from power. The Liberal Democrats seek a
second referendum, while the Scottish nationalists seek to exploit
the government’s difficulties to further the case for independence.
There is no obvious resolution of the problem that could secure
majority support.
There is no obvious resolution of the problem that could secure
majority support. Were Britain to remain in the EU’s customs union,
it would be unable to sign independent trade agreements. Were it to
remain in the EU’s internal market, it would have to accept freedom
of movement. Yet control of immigration from the European Union was
one of the main motivations behind the Brexit vote.
At this point, there seem to be just three alternatives. The first
is May’s deal, perhaps in a slightly modified form. The second is
for Britain to leave the EU without a deal; even though most MPs are
against a no-deal Brexit, they find themselves unable to agree on an
alternative. The third is for Parliament throw the issue back to the
people in a second referendum, even though the prime minister has so
far opposed such a move, and its advocates cannot agree on the
question to be asked. Finally, given that the country remains almost
evenly divided, a second referendum would not necessarily resolve the
conflict.
The issue of Britain’s place in (or out of) Europe has arguably
destroyed five of the last six Conservative prime ministers—Harold
Macmillan, Edward Heath, Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and David
Cameron. It may be about to bring down another.
Vernon Bogdanor is a professor of government at
King’s College, London. His book Brexit and the Constitution
will be published next year. In 2019, he will be giving the Stimson
lecture at Yale University on the consequences of Brexit for Britain
and the European Union.
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