"They should have decided to disband the SDS". The final eight words of David Barr KC, counsel to the inquiry, when giving his closing statement for the Tranche 1 phase of the inquiry (1968-1979). Later Barr stated that: "We cannot rule out that some [SDS intelligence], once filed, was leaked to the private sector and misused to blacklist activists". The counsel of the inquiry is not on the side of the activists spied upon, but is there to provide the general thinking of the inquiry so far. He has stated that an Interim Report will be produced soon. Full statement is available here: https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230216-CTIs_T1_Closing_Statement.pdf
111. The SDS was created in 1968 to deal with a specific, large scale public order threat, for which there was a concrete basis for concern. It used relatively short and shallow deployments to gather valuable intelligence about the October 1968 Demonstration. The unit then became a permanent feature, deploying undercover officers continuously into far-left groups, often with vague remits. Individual deployments which lasted for several years became the norm. Officers became involved in the lives of those they were spying on. Although, they were not ordered or encouraged to do so, in some instances, this went as far as sex. Reporting was extensive, unfiltered, deeply personal and often recorded in unprofessional terms. We cannot rule out that some of it, once filed, was leaked to the private sector and misused to blacklist activists.
The whole operation was secret and a very high priority was accorded to keeping it that way. Courts were sometimes misled. Miscarriages of justice occurred as a result. An officer whose cover was compromised was told to pretend that he was acting independently. Discipline was not enforced. Aspects of deceased’s children’s identities were used even though they added only a limited further protection.
These operations have caused a lot of harm. Democratic freedoms have been infringed, outrage and pain has been caused. The damage is not limited to members of the public. Former undercover officers have suffered psychiatric injury.
The primary reason for conducting these operations was to gain intelligence to assist police to maintain order on the streets. However, the level of threat posed to public order was often not commensurate with a need to deploy undercover police officers for this purpose. Not in the way that they operated. The benefits which the unit’s intelligence brought to public order policing do not, in our submission, justify the means.
The ancillary reason for the SDS’ work was to assist the Security Service to counter subversion. However, the evidence of the SDS’ own officers and other contemporary documents show that the groups targeted by the SDS did not meet the official definition of subversion. Many of those targeted were revolutionaries. But they did not threaten the safety or wellbeing of the State. In the words of Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Sir Robert Mark, they were “a bad joke”.
There was a remarkable lack of oversight, formal training and instruction. However, the SDS was not a rogue unit. It was part of a larger intelligence gathering apparatus and counter subversion effort which also operated in secrecy. The SDS was known to the chain of command within the Metropolitan Police Service. Senior officers visited the unit on occasion and met its undercover officers. They received annual reports about the unit’s work. The existence of the SDS was known to some within the Security Service, the Home Office and, to a lesser extent, the Cabinet Office.
We remain of the view expressed in last month’s submissions. There was no effective review of the SDS’ operation. No one appears to have considered whether the level of intrusion occasioned by SDS long-term undercover police deployments was justified. No one appears to have addressed their mind specifically to the legality of the SDS’ operations. No one appears to have considered whether (after its introduction) both limbs of the Harris definition were met. There is a strong case for concluding that, had they done so, they should have decided to disband the SDS.
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