The left and self-determination
Excerpt from 'INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM' Issue: 155
Posted on 29th June 2017 Héctor Sierra
P
ODERMOS and IU have refused to lend their support to the
pro-independence majority. They have argued that CiU waves the flag of
independence to divert attention from its own role in implementing cuts
and have accused CUP and ERC of helping whitewash its neoliberal record.
But CiU never really supported independence, embracing the cause only
when it saw it was unstoppable. And no one has done as much to unmask
their responsibility for austerity in Catalonia as the CUP’s militants.
The current attitude towards self-determination by parties such as
Podemos and IU has been typical of the Spanish left at crucial points in
the country’s history. Both the Communist Party (closely tied to the
Soviet Union) during the Civil War (1936-9), and the Eurocommunist
current during the transition to democracy, were dismissive of the
nationalist movements, when not openly conceding to Spanish chauvinism.
IU claims to be interested not in any national struggle, but in
the social struggle, missing the point that Catalan independence is
interlinked with the most radical demands of society. They pose as
internationalists, but Catalan and Spanish nationalism cannot be
equated. Spanish chauvinism is an ideology pumped out from the top of
society, whose core components were devised by the Catholic Church and
the fascist regime over 40 years and which today remains in the hands of
the state. What is commonly branded as Catalan (or Basque) nationalism
is a much more complex affair, and does not lie firmly in the grip of
the Catalan bourgeoisie. Independence means different things for the
different classes supporting it. For instance, former Catalan president
Artur Mas said in a visit to the US that an independent Catalonia would
remain loyal to Nato—but among working class people there is a broad
consensus that the country would not have an army.
Refusal to back independence has also been justified on the grounds
that it weakens the unity of the Spanish working class. But, while there
have been repeated attempts to divide Spanish and Catalan workers, they
have come from politicians and the media, not from below. In fact, the
national minorities are a ruling class’s recurrent scapegoat when it
comes to diverting attention from issues such as austerity or
corruption. The way to achieve unity among workers is precisely through
supporting the rights of Catalans and Basques, continuously under
attack, and challenging scapegoating, something the Spanish left has
largely failed to do.
Podemos’s talk of a multinational state, inspired by Errejón’s study
of Bolivian politics, was refreshing at first. Iglesias and Errejón
tried to appeal to left voters in Catalonia and the Basque Country by
arguing that Podemos would bring about the democratisation of the
Spanish state that would make possible a recognition of their national
rights.
But while paying lip service to self-determination, in practice they
have proved unable even to lend support to non-binding municipal
initiatives for the democratic right to a referendum.
More recently, Iglesias has proposed a status of shared sovereignty as an alternative to independence.
This, of course, presupposes and is reliant on an eventual Podemos-led
government. Unlike these abstract prospect, the possibility of
independence exists now and is within reach.
There is nothing inherent in the Catalan working class that makes it
more left-wing than that of the rest of the state, and arguments of that
kind should be challenged as they foster illusions about the viability
of socialism developing within the limits of a single country. An
independent Catalonia could well end up being another capitalist state,
controlled by its national bourgeoisie that goes on exploiting workers.
But there was nothing inevitable about Catalan society shifting to the
left because of plummeting living standards. It has been the leading
role of the Catalan left, along with the systematic work of the
anti-fascist platform Unitat Contra el Feixisme (UCFR) in preventing
fascist groups from tapping into the mood, that has ensured this was the
case. The same remains true when it comes to fighting for independence
and defining its content.
The unmissable fact is that right now the left in Catalonia has a
much more advantageous balance of forces than in the rest of the state,
and levels of class confidence and consciousness are higher there—which
is not to say that they cannot develop to the same extent everywhere
else. Indeed, ensuring a victory for the Catalan left could be the way
to achieve this goal.
The damage to the Spanish ruling class that the loss of Catalonia
would cause is unimaginable; Catalonia makes a large contribution to the
state’s revenues, with 18.8 percent of national GDP. The centrality of
national unity to the dominant ideology of the ruling class would also
turn the event into a political earthquake. A victory for independence
would thus precipitate a crisis of unforeseeable consequences, throwing
into chaos not only the PP but Spanish capitalism as a whole.
Socialism can only be achieved internationally, but by opening new
prospects for the left in Catalonia and by breaking the consensus
imposed by fascism in the transition to democracy, Catalan independence
would advance the cause of the entire working class. And, if a triumph
of the Catalan left would be a positive development for workers in the
rest of the state, what would the consequences of its defeat be?
Due to the need to look strong and stable, and the pressure exerted
by the Spanish nationalist lobby, the PP has refused to negotiate with
the Catalan parliament. The pro-independence majority has pledged to
organise a referendum on 1 October but all the calls on the central
government to cooperate have fallen on deaf ears.
Likewise CiU and ERC have fruitlessly sought the intervention of the EU
and third countries to lift the bar on a referendum. The EU will not
accept the unilateral separation of part of a member state, and the idea
of being out of the EU sends shivers down the spine of CiU politicians.
As it becomes clearer that to go ahead with the referendum will involve
an open confrontation with the Spanish state, and that they no longer
control the process in motion, the risk exists that the Catalan
bourgeoisie will instead try to strike a deal from above. However,
awareness that supporters of independence are running out of patience
and will not accept more excuses complicates this.
Meanwhile, threats and attacks by the Spanish state have mounted.
Individuals and associations have been brought to court for organising a
non-binding referendum in 2014 that was ruled illegal. Activists of the
CUP have also faced trial for burning pictures of the Spanish king at a
public event. The main newspapers in Madrid and senior army officers
have repeatedly asked the government to send the army in and suspend
Catalan autonomy, as the constitution allows.
Only the CUP discounted from the beginning the possibility of an
agreed referendum and has demanded the Catalan Parliament stop obeying
laws coming from Madrid. The work of activists in the CUP’s ranks and
other left groups in the next months will be crucial to bring pressure
from below to bear on the Catalan government. A half-heartedly called
referendum will give Rajoy the excuse he is awaiting to act. An actual
military intervention cannot be ruled out in the end. If this happened,
nobody can seriously think that it would not be followed by an immediate
clampdown on opposition everywhere else in the state and by new steps
towards authoritarianism. What the left does inside and outside
Catalonia can prevent this scenario. The leadership of Podemos and IU
will act according to an electoral logic, but every activist, in these
or other groups, who wants to challenge the system must actively support
independence. Solidarity with Catalonia can make a fundamental
difference.
Conclusion: further destabilisation
It must not be forgotten that the PP is in office only because of the
failure of all the other parties to form a government. In the long run
stability remains impossible and Rajoy does not rule out calling a new
general election if the opposition PSOE, whose goodwill his government
depends on, obstructs his work.
The PSOE say that they are the real opposition, not Podemos, while
siding with the conservatives whenever stability is at stake. But they
are deeply divided. A managing board controlled the party for half a
year after Sánchez’s removal, until in May a new leadership election
took place. Sánchez, although marginalised by the bureaucracy, stood
again on an anti-Rajoy platform and beat Susana Díaz, the candidate of
the establishment. While this revived the talks of a hypothetical left
coalition headed by PSOE and Podemos, the PSOE has since abstained in a
motion of no confidence against Rajoy put forward by Podemos in June. It
is uncertain to what extent the PSOE, still a pillar of the system, can
be moved leftwards. Nevertheless, the rebellion that has brought
Sánchez back to power has exposed the noncomformity of a majority of the
membership.
More importantly, the PP might have been able to mitigate the
effects of the economic crisis temporarily, but the structural problems
that brought the Spanish economy to its knees when the financial bubble
burst remain untouched.
Investing in property and other forms of fictitious capital are still
an important part of the economy, while productive investment and
profitability remain low. This makes the Spanish economy extremely
vulnerable to any upheaval in international markets in coming years.
Corruption remains rampant. Hardly a week goes by without new
scandals involving PP members coming to light. While Rajoy has so far
dodged any investigations, he is due to testify in court as a witness in
relation to inquiries into senior party members close to him. The
Prosecutor’s Office for corruption is tightly controlled by the
conservatives, so many cases do not lead to prison sentences, but
corruption is an issue with the potential to unite people from all walks
of life against the government.
As the dockers have shown, austerity can be fought. The labour
reforms can be repealed. The Gag Law can be resisted. Rajoy’s government
is weak and it can be brought down before 2020.
On the way to this goal, Podemos, IU and the unions are travelling
companions, but the initiative must not be abandoned to their leaders.
If the left stands another chance to form a government, this should be
welcomed and supported, without abandoning the critique of reformism or
the building of a revolutionary party and without allowing mobilisation
to decline again.
In making all this possible, the key issue that can alter the balance
of power, throwing the Spanish state’s rulers on the defensive, is
Catalonia.
Héctor Sierra is a Spanish socialist based in London and a member of the SWP.
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